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Beyond

Canterbury:
Can Medicine
and Law- Agree
about Informed
Consent? And
Does .It Matter?
Marc D. Ginsberg

or those of us whose scholar hip fo uses
on medi o-1egal jurisprudence, t he law of
informed consent is a gift. It has been a fertile
topic of discussion for decades, with no end in sight.
Although it is not difficult to acknowledge that patient
autonomy is at the core of informed consent, the doctrine is not static - it has evolved in scope1 and continues to engage courts in thought provoking analysis.2
There is no doubt that the doctrine of informed consent is fundamental to the physician-patient relationship.3 My concern, and the purpose of this paper, is to
consider that true informed consent is a lofty goal but,
possibly, unattainable.
I noted in a previous paper that it would be unnecessary to expound in detail about the history of informed
<.:unsent,4 and the same is true for the purposes of
this paper. Nevertheless, a few points are worthy of
mention. Informed consent is possibly, if not likely,
of ancient origin. 5 Certainly, the doctrine focuses on
patient autonomy, about which the celebrated opinion of then Judge Cardozo in Schloendoiffv. Society of
New York Hospital6 stated:

F

Every human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body; and a surgeon who
performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in
damages. 7
This notion of patient self-determination is central to
informed consent and, in theory, derives from information disclosed to the patient by the physician concerning the risks, benefits and complications of, and
alternatives to, a recommended treatment or procedure. A physician who provided unconsented treatment could be liable in tort for a battery. 8 A "consented
to" treatment or procedure would not support a battery claim but consent obtained in the absence of a
proper disclosure to the patient would support a medical negligence claim for lack of informed consent. 9
Basic to the physician-patient relationship is the
standard of care. The standard of care is that care
which a reasonably well qualified physician would
provide to a patient under the same or similar circumstances.10 The standard of care then, is used to evaluate physician conduct, including the need to obtain a
patient's informed consent.
There are two basic models of informed consent
- the professional model and the reasonable patient
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model.H The professional model focuses on the examination of the informed consent disclosure from the
standpoint of the reasonable physician. This model of
informed consent requires the use of expert testimony
to prove that the physician failed to obtain informed
consent. The reasonable patient model focuses on
the physician's disclosure from the standpoint of the
patient - what information would a reasonable patient
want to know before consenting to a proposed treatment or procedure.

Canterbury v. Spence Shapes Informed
Consent
For almost 45 years, the opinion in Canterbury v.
Spence 12 has been central to the reasonable patient
model of informed consent, linking the materiality

This pronouncement teaches that informed consent
requires a disclosure, not a dialogue 16 or a conversation with the patient, not demanding significant, if
any, patient engagement. Yet, if patient consent is
truly to be "informed," the doctrine of informed consent, if it is effective, requires patient understanding,
suggesting something more than only a physician
disclosure. 17 Of course, neither Canterbury nor any
other judicial pronouncement can guarantee or provide an enforcement mechanism for patient understanding. Therefore, the concept of informed consent
seems strained at a basic level.

Law vs. Medicine

Canterbury18 creates another problem for medicine,
relating to the establishment of the standard of care
to which physicians should be held. The
development of practice guidelines by physicians "set the de facto standard for mediThere is no doubt that the doctrine of
cal practice and therefore influence clinical decisions about individual patients,
infonned consent is fi.tndan1ental to the
[and] practice measures ...."19 Yet, insofar
physician-patient relationship. My concern,
as the development of informed consent is
and the purpose of this paper, is to consider
concerned, Canterbury 20 teaches that the
law of informed consent is too important
that true infonned consent is a lofty goal but,
to leave its imposition to the medical propossibly, unattainable.
fession. The Canterbury 21 court emphasized this point when stating:

of the risk to be disclosed to the patient's decision to
undertake a proposed treatment. 13 Canterbury,14 however, provides another important insight into the law
of informed consent, through its most compelling
footnote 36, which states as follows:
We discard the thought that the patient should
ask for information before the physician is
required to disclose. Caveat emptor is not the
norm for the consumer of medical services. Duty
to disclose is more than a call to speak merely
on the patient's request, or merely to answer the
patient's questions; it is a duty to volunteer, if
necessary, the information the patient needs for
intelligent decision. The patient may be ignorant, confused, overawed by the physician or
frightened by the hospital, or even ashamed to
inquire. [Citation Omitted] Perhaps relatively
few patients could in any event identify the relevant questions in the absence of prior explanation by the physician. Physicians and hospitals
have patients of widely divergent socio-economic
backgrounds, and a rule which presumes a
degree of sophistication which many members of
society lack is likely to breed gross inequities. 15
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Respect for the patient's right of self-determination on particular therapy demands a standard set
by law for physicians rather than one which physicians may or may not impose upon themselves. 22
This lack of trust in medicine by "the law" likely causes
diminished respect for law by medicine. 2 3
A memorable, recent example of a court intruding in
the realm of medicine and informed consent is Jandre
v. Wisconsin Injured Patients and Families Compensation Fund. 24 In Jandre, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
interpreted an informed consent statute to require the
disclosure of the differential diagnosis, discarded diagnoses and strategies to explore the potential range of
diagnoses. Wisconsin physicians foughtJandrethrough
the legislative process and successfully influenced an
informed consent statutory amendment. 25
Jandre 26 may also be an example of another basic
conflict between law and medicine, also applicable
to informed consent, pertaining to evidence and the
resolution of disputes. It has been noted that:
Courts and health care have historically viewed
evidence in fundamentally disparate ways ... The
legal system is built on an adversarial model...
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Disputes about facts are left to a jury or judge
to decide, and the goal is to ensure fair process
rather than fair outcomes or truth. Juxtaposed
to this, empirical evidence in medicine seeks to
define a single unimpeachable truth that can
stand on its own. Moreover, medical evidence
often focuses on populations, while at the court
level, the evidence must be relevant to the single
injured patient. 2 7
The point here is that physicians may accuse the legal
system of advising them how to practice medicine,
based upon a private claim against an individual physician by an individual patient. This no less applies
to the law of informed consent. Physicians may very
well base their disclosures on their experiences with
typical risks, benefits and complications of treatments
and therapies and these experiences may not intersect with information a patient believes is material
to a treatment decision. In a sense, informed consent
involves some physician "crystal ball gazing" - predicting certain potential complications or poor outcomes
possibly important to a given patient in order to build
a defense to an informed consent claim in the event
that complication or outcome occurs.

patients is to defer to their "physicians to make treatment decisions rather than using a more collaborative
pr cess:' 30 Expressed a bit differently, ''for the majority
of patients who are less educated, less well informed,
and less able to marshal their arguments - a somewhat more directive or (without being pejorative)
'paternalistic' approach will be far more appropriate
and gratefully received:'31 If this opinion is accurate,
perhaps the law should contemplate a patient's "consent;' informed or not. More on this point later, when
patient health literacy is discussed.
Looking at the informed consent process, pursuant
to Canterbury, 32 the law, created by courts for physicians, contemplates a disclosure. The patient need neither engage nor participate in a discussion with the
physician. It appears, however, that medicine views
informed consent as a communicative process with
patient involvement. 33 For example, it has been suggested that "[t]he heart ofinformed consent, however,
is a conversation between physician and patient about
a proposed treatment, alternative treatments, nontreatment, and the risks and benefits of each of these
options."34
More specifically, consider the description of
informed consent by the American College of Surgeons (ACS) on its patient education site: 35

Patient Participation and Understanding
Should the law of informed consent contemplate
patient participation in decision making as a necessary corollary of patient autonomy? The basic concept
here is that a well-informed patient will be capable of
making an informed decision about proposed treatment. However, it is not at all certain that patients
uniformly desire to make treatment decisions.
The process of the "perfect treatment decision"28 has
been described as follows:
In actual practice, the most reliable way to
approach the ideal of the perfect treatment decision is through intense collaboration among
health care professionals and with patients. A
"perfect treatment decision" must be based on
two elements: the most up-to-date scientific
knowledge, which in its burgeoning complexity cannot possibly be mastered by individual
physicians acting on their own; and the patient's
values in choosing among various treatment
options with different mixes of benefits and
risks, which cannot possibly be known by individual physicians unless they openly and honestly collaborate with their patients. 29
Even if the perfect treatment decision is realistic,
there is data suggesting that the preference of many
108

Informed Consent
Before having your operation, you will be
asked to indicate that you understand the nature
of the surgical procedure to be performed and
that you give your permission for the operation.
This may appear to be a formality, but, in
fact, this process should be taken very seriously.
Before your operation, frankly discuss with your
surgeon any questions or concerns that you have.
Of course, not everyone wants to know all the
specific details of the surgical procedure itself,
but you should seek the answers to questions
such as:
What are the indications that have led your
doctor to the opinion that an operation is
necessary?
What, if any, alternative treatments are available for your condition?
What will be the likely result if you don't have
the operation?
What are the basic procedures involved in the
operation?
What are the risks?
How is the operation expected to improve your
health or quality oflife?
Is hospitalization necessary and, if so, how
long can you expect to be hospitalized?
JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS
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What can you expect during your recovery
period?
When can you expect to resume normal
activities?
Are there likely to be residual effects from the
operation?
Of course, your surgeon may volunteer much
of this information ... 36
Why is the ACS encouraging patients to seek answers
to questions which should be addressed in a mandatory disclosure calculated to obtain the patient's
informed consent to a surgical procedure? The Canterbury37 model does not suggest that the physician
"may volunteer"38 information material to the patient
- the physician must disclose the information.

doctrine of informed consent is patient understanding
of the physician's required disclosure. Is this a realistic
expectation? I have previously written that:
Health literacy has been defined 'as the capacity
to acquire, understand and use information in
ways which promote and maintain good health'
and as 'the degree to which individuals have the
capacity to obtain, process, and understand basic
health information and services needed to make
appropriate health decisions:4 2
As of 2004, it was estimated that "nearly half of all
American adults (90 million people) have difficulty
understanding and acting on health information."4 3
This statistic must have implications for the doc-

Looking at the inforn1ed consent process, pursuant to Canterbu1~y, the law,
created by courts for physicians, conte1nplates a disclosure. The patient need
neither engage nor participate in a discussion with the physician. It appears,
however, that 1nedicine views informed consent as a con1n1unicative process
with patient involven1ent. For exan1ple, it has been suggested that
"[t]he heart of infonned consent, however, is a conversation between
physician and patient about a proposed treatn1ent, alternative treatn1ents,
nontreat1nent, and the risks and benefits of each of these options."

The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) has published a Committee Opinion on informed consent39 which provides, in relevant
part, as follows:
5. Informed consent should be looked on as a
process rather than a signature on a form. This
process includes a mutual sharing of information
over time between the clinician and the patient
to facilitate the patient's autonomy in the process
of making ongoing choices. 4 0

There is no question that a consent form signed by a
patient is not informed consent. 41 At best, the signed
consent form is evidence of informed consent. But,
again, the idea that informed consent necessarily
involves a sharing of information between physician
and patient, in the nature of a dialogue, is simply not
the legal model of informed consent, which requires a
disclosure.
Not to be overlooked is the "informed" component
of informed consent. Implicit (if not explicit) in the
RECONCEPTUALIZING INFORMED CONSENT• SPRING 2017
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trine of informed consent. Simply put, it is likely
that many adult patients will not comprehend the
required informed consent disclosure. The disclosure
is required to recognize patient autonomy. Yet, if many
patients are unable to understand the disclosure, consent will not be "informed" and autonomy will not be
served.

Conclusion
I am hopeful that this paper has demonstrated
the stress and conflicts inherent in the doctrine of
informed consent. The law, not physicians, creates
the rules for informed consent. Canterbury 4 4 requires
a one-way disclosure from physician to patient, typically describing the proposed treatment, its risks,
benefits, complications and alternatives (including
no treatment at all). Significant and influential medical associations (ACS, ACOG) suggest that informed
consent is a process involving patient participation.
Often, patients prefer to allow their physicians to
make the treatment decisions for them; perhaps
because they sought the advice from their physi109
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cians due to their professional expertise or, perhaps
because health literacy statistics reveal that many
patients simply lack the wherewithal to participate
in an informed consent process and to understand
health related information. Therefore, it may be
fair to urge that the law, medicine and patients do
not share the same values and are not of one mind
regarding informed consent.
The scope of informed consent has evolved since
Canterbury 45 and courts have considered topics
for disclosure likely not contemplated at that time,
including factors personal to the physician and the
differential diagnosis. 46 Quite recently, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey determined that the doctrine of
informed consent did not require a physician to disclose the lack of professional liability insurance coverage to cover a potential loss. 47 These are interesting
topics but they divert our attention from a considerable issue - whether the doctrine of informed consent
is realistic and productive due to conflicts among the
interests of the law, physicians and patients. If these
interests do not intersect, the goal of informed consent
may not be realized.
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